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Abstract 
 
Three varieties of institutionalism currently dominate International Business 
studies: new institutional economics, new organizational institutionalism, and 
comparative historical institutionalism. Yet currently applied measures of 
institutional country distance predominantly build on the thought of the first two 
strands of institutionalism. This paper sets out to address this under-
representation of comparative historical institutional thought in currently 
available measures of institutional distance. Building on Whitley’s business 
systems framework, a measure of institutional distance is developed and validated 
which captures intrinsic, substantive institutional differences in economic 
organization, rather than differences in institutional effectiveness. The results of 
the two-stage cluster analysis used to validate the selected indicators closely 
approximate the business systems typology, which is both indicative of the validity 
of this measure and of the distinctiveness of the business system types that make 
up the business system framework. 
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5 
Introduction 
 
Country differences are central to many of the questions addressed in 
International Business (IB) studies, and intrinsic substantive country differences 
have been employed to explain a wide range of behaviour by multinational 
enterprises. National cultural differences for example, have been used to explain 
the location of MNE activity (e.g. Grosse and Goldberg, 1991; Grosse and Trevino, 
1996), entry and establishment mode selection (e.g. Kogut and Singh, 1988; 
Drogendijk and Slangen, 2006), internationalization sequence (Erramilli, 1991), or 
international joint venture dissolution (Park and Ungson, 1997; Hennart and 
Zeng, 2002). In recent years, institutional differences and the notion of 
institutional distance have received particular attention, as evidenced for instance 
in a string of special issues on the role of institutions in the Journal of International 
Management (2003), Organization Studies (2005) and, recently, the Journal of 
International Business Studies (2008). 
 
What institutions are however, and what types of institutions are of interest, 
differs by level of analysis and by the subject under consideration (Aoki, 2001; 
Scott, 1995). As a result, several varieties of institutionalism have emerged (Scott, 
1995), and various measures of institutional distance have been developed and 
applied in correspondence with these different varieties of institutionalism. Three 
varieties in particular have recently dominated in IB research: new institutional 
economics, new organizational institutionalism, and comparative historical 
institutionalism1. For the first two strands of institutionalism, relatively well-
developed measures of institutional distance are available, such as measures on the 
rule of law as employed in comparative corporate governance (e.g. La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998), or there is consensus on how 
suitable instruments can be developed, as in the case of new organizational 
institutionalism (e.g. Kostova, 1999; and Busenitz et al., 2000). 
 
The starting point of the third variety of institutionalism, comparative historical 
institutionalism (e.g. Whitley, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001), is that the key 
institutional elements in a society are reciprocally constituted. Key institutional 
and societal features are presumed to develop interdependently over time, 
resulting in intrinsic differences in economic organization between countries. One 
of the more elaborate comparative institutional frameworks available is developed 
in the work of Richard Whitley on national business systems (e.g. Whitley, 1992; 
1999). Whitley points to the coherent variation of countries on key institutional 
features and business system characteristics, such as between characteristics of the 
domestic financial system and the type of owner control, on the basis of which 
                                                
1 Comparative institutionalism here refers to the varieties of capitalism approach rather than Aoki’s 
and others game-theoretic approach to macro-economic institutional diversity and change. 
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distinctive business system types can be distinguished. Due to the complex 
interdependencies between societal features, this strand of institutionalism largely 
relies on extensive systematic qualitative comparisons to describe such differences 
between countries (Maurice, 2000). Partially as a result of this qualitative 
orientation, no appropriate indicator of institutional distance is currently available 
which builds on the thought of comparative historical institutionalism. 
 
This is a major omission from the IB literature, given the central role of intrinsic 
country differences in our understanding of International Business. It implies that 
for many IB researchers, currently available measures of institutional distance do 
not suffice. The institutional indicators borrowed from international economics 
are indicative of the effectiveness of (formal) institutions, such as in protecting 
property rights and in preventing corruption, rather than of intrinsic differences 
in country-level institutions such as between Germany and the United Kingdom. 
Instead, measures of institutional distance developed from the perspective of new 
organizational institutionalism rely on the decomposition of the institutional 
context into the regulative, normative, and cognitive components which guide 
social behaviour (e.g. Kostova, 1997, 1999; Walsh, 1995; Busenitz et al., 2000). 
However, social behaviour is constrained by different institutional elements in 
different settings, and such measures can therefore only be compiled with respect 
to narrow domains (Kostova and Roth, 2002), such as the legitimacy of a 
particular organizational practice, which is at a much lower level of analysis than 
the majority of studies in International Business. 
 
The objective in this paper is to develop a measure of institutional distance which 
captures intrinsic, substantive institutional country differences in economic 
organization, rather than differences in institutional effectiveness. The measure or 
indicator of institutional distance developed in this paper is based on the key 
institutional features applied by Whitley (1999) to distinguish and characterize 
distinctive business systems. In the development of such a measure of comparative 
institutional distance, three consecutive steps are taken. The first step is the 
identification of suitable indicators which approximate these key institutional 
features. The second step is the verification of the validity of the selected 
indicators. To that end, we perform a two-step cluster analysis to assess whether 
Whitley’s business system typology can be reproduced on the basis of the selected 
indicators. The final step is the design of the institutional distance measure, and 
the calculation of institutional country distances between the OECD countries 
used in our sample. We start this paper with a discussion of the three varieties of 
institutionalism which have dominated International Business, and with a 
discussion of Whitley’s business system typology. 
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Varieties of institutionalism and institutional distance 
 
Scholars in economics, sociology, political science and organization studies rely on 
vastly different conceptions of what institutions are. Such varieties of 
institutionalism differ in whether institutions are primarily perceived as regulative 
systems, normative systems or cultural-cognitive systems, as well as in the level of 
analysis (Scott, 1995). As a result, depending on focus and level of aggregation, 
scholars with an interest in institutions have come to focus on such diverse topics 
as the effect of formal regulations on the location of foreign investment (e.g. 
Bevan, Estrin, and Meyer, 2004), the effect of new technologies on job roles in 
radiology departments (Barley, 1986), or the role of organizational symbolism 
(Dandridge, Mitroff, and Joyce, 1980). Ultimately, as Aoki (2001) concludes, 
“which definition of an institution to adopt is not an issue of right or wrong; it 
depends on the purpose of the analysis” (Aoki, 2001: 10). 
 
Of all the varieties of institutionalism, three varieties in particular have dominated 
International Business research over the past two decades, namely new economic 
institutionalism (or rather new institutional economics), new organizational 
institutionalism, and comparative historical institutionalism. The identification of 
the dominant varieties of institutionalism is of course dependent on the issue at 
hand, and on where one draws the line between International Business and other 
domains. Morgan and Kristensen (2006) for example only distinguish between 
organizational institutionalism and comparative historical institutionalism, which 
suits their discussion on the institutional duality within MNEs. The three strands 
of institutionalism which are considered here however, correspond with the 
dominant themes which are addressed within the broad domain of International 
Business; both in terms of research questions and in terms of level of analysis. 
While the aim is not to be exhaustive—a rare feat when one attempts to discuss 
the many (and heterogeneous) strands and sub-strands of institutionalism—an 
attempt is made to position each variety within either economics or sociology. It is 
illustrated that for each variety of institutionalism appropriate measures of institu-
tional differences are available except for comparative historical institutionalism. 
 
New Institutional Economics 
 
The first dominant strand of institutionalism in International Business, new 
institutional economics, is strongly rooted in microeconomic thought. New 
institutional economic thought has found widespread application in, for example, 
historical economics (North, 1990, 1991) and in game theoretic approaches to the 
formation and change of macro-economic institutions (Aoki, 2001), but also in 
the sub-fields of International Business in which the effectiveness of country-level 
institutions is paramount. The kernel of new institutional economics is perhaps 
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best understood in contrast with the view of institutions from which it intended to 
differentiate itself, that of the ‘old’ institutional economists such as Thorstein 
Veblen, John Commons, and Gunnar Myrdal. 
 
At the beginning of the 20th century, and in particular in the interbellum, a group 
of economists rebelled against the neo-classical view of the economy as a relatively 
closed model. The fundamental principle of what became known as institutional 
economics was that as all institutional features of society are interdependent 
(including individual preferences), the analysis of economic problems cannot 
occur without taking into account the dynamics of the entire social system 
(Myrdal, 1978). However, the acknowledgement of institutional idiosyncrasies 
and the complexities of society implied that their institutional analyses often 
resulted in “tentative generalizations and mere plausible hypotheses” (Myrdal, 
1978: 775), which to others appeared to contribute little to the formation of theory 
(Coase, 1998). Following World War II therefore, the role of institutional 
economics was largely marginalized in favour of conventional economics 
(Hodgson, 2007; Lowndes, 1996). 
 
Widespread appreciation in economics for the role of institutions returned in the 
1970s and 1980s, most notably through the work of Douglas North and Oliver 
Williamson, in the form of new institutional economics. Both old and new 
institutional economists acknowledge that institutions matter. The crucial 
difference however is that new institutional economists view institutions as 
endogenous, or as adaptable constraints, rather than as conditioning individual 
choice. As such, individuals are assumed to create and shape institutions 
independent of cultural preferences, and they are assumed to do so according to 
the principles of microeconomics (Mayhew, 1989). This permits a detailed 
analysis of both institutions and their effectiveness. The hallmark definition of 
institutions in new institutional economics comes from historical economist 
Douglas North (1990), who states that “institutions are the rules of the game in a 
society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction” (1990: 3). Although North and others acknowledge the existence of 
both formal and informal institutions, in practice new institutional economics is 
often reflected in a focus on (compliance with) formal rules and regulations 
(Williamson, 2000). 
 
Current discussions on institutions in economics have moved beyond the simple 
dichotomy between old and new institutional economics. Aoki (2001), Greif 
(1998) and others for example, have adopted a largely game-theoretical approach 
to understanding the emergence of institutions. While comparative institutional 
analysis, as it has become known, remains strongly rooted in new institutional 
perspectives of institutions, comparative institutional analysts pay particular 
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attention to the interdependence between the outcomes of games in various 
economic domains (Aoki, 2001). However, perhaps more interesting in the light 
of the current discussion is the recent revivalism of old institutional economic 
thought, in particular the evolutionary work of Veblen and the notion of 
endogenous preferences, in understanding socio-economic evolution (e.g. Brette, 
2006; Hodgson, 1998, 2003, 2007; Potts, 2007). A similar trend is that even new 
institutionalists such as Douglas North increasingly acknowledge the cognitive 
implications of institutions (Dequech, 2002; Hodgson, 2007). 
 
In International Business however, most economics-based approaches to 
institutions essentially remain new institutional economic perspectives on what 
institutions are, and on how and why they affect organizations. Therefore, what 
continues to distinguish economics-based views of institutions from sociological 
and organization theory-based views of institutions in IB is that saliently, 
institutions are presumed to constrain the actions of actors in the pursuit of their 
interests, but institutions are presumed to have no or little effect on the interests 
which actors pursue, or on the preferences of actors other than what the rules of 
the game exclude. For example, as Aguilera and Jackson (2003) note, agency-
approaches to comparative corporate governance traditionally focus on 
characterizing different governance mechanisms, but are unable to account for the 
observed differences in governance. In addition, institutions or institutional 
characteristics are implicitly assumed to be relatively unrelated; there is at least 
more concern for the effectiveness of individual institutions than for the idea of 
coherent institutional configurations. This has translated into what Jackson and 
Deeg (2008) term a “variable-based approach” to institutions, in which 
institutions are conceived as factors which quite independently “constrain or 
impact […] the cost of IB activity” (Jackson and Deeg, 2008: 542). 
 
This is not necessarily problematic. Within International Business, new 
institutional economical perspectives are most often assumed in studies which 
focus at the effects of differences in the effectiveness of country-level institutions. 
Examples are studies on the effect of formal institutions on trust in business 
partners (Rao, Pearce, and Xin, 2005), or on the effectiveness of macro-economic 
institutions in providing the stable institutional environment necessary for the 
establishment of wholly-owned subsidiaries (as in Meyer, 2001; Meyer and Peng, 
2003; and Dikova and Van Witteloostuijn, 2007). For many studies implicitly 
adopting a new institutional economical perspective on institutions, therefore, the 
selection of indicators on institutional effectiveness simply suits their research 
objectives. It becomes problematic however when studies include indicators on 
institutional effectiveness where a measure of intrinsic institutional differences 
would be more appropriate.  
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New Organizational Institutionalism 
 
The second dominant variety of institutionalism within International Business is 
new organizational institutionalism (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Rooted in sociology and organization 
theory, the focus of new organizational institutionalism is on organizational forms 
and organizational practices (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) rather than on ‘the 
rules of the game’ of new institutional economics. Similar to how new 
institutional economics is best understood when contrasted with old institutional 
economics, new organizational institutionalism is best understood in contrast to 
‘old’ organizational institutionalism, even if the differences between the two are 
less pronounced than in the case of old and new institutional economics 
(Lowndes, 1996). 
 
The use of the phrase ‘old institutionalism’ is somewhat deceptive, as it may 
suggest that the institutionalisms in sociology and organization science which 
predated new organizational institutionalism are relatively homogeneous. This is 
not the case, as for example Scott (1987) illustrates in a seminal review of the 
“many faces of institutional theory” (1987: 493). The ‘old’ organizational 
institutionalism against which the ‘new’ positioned itself however, is the strain of 
organizational institutionalism of which Philip Selznick has been singled out as the 
main proponent (see Powell and DiMaggio, 1991); not the least because of his 
hallmark definition of organizational institutions. 
 
The focus of old organizational institutionalists such as Selznick (1949, 1957; 
Broom and Selznick, 1955) and Clark (1960, 1972) has been on explaining the 
distinctiveness or ‘character’ of individual organizations. It was argued that 
organizations develop such distinctive characters, such as distinctive practices 
(Clark, 1960) and distinctive competences (Selznick, 1952), because in the 
interplay between internal interests and the external environment some practices 
become institutionalized. Such practices persist even when conditions change 
because they become “infuse[d] with value beyond the technical requirements of 
the task at hand” (Selznick, 1957: 17). Although in current depictions of the old 
institutionalism conflict, power and influence are often emphasized (e.g. Powell 
and DiMaggio, 1991; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996), old institutionalists see 
institutionalization as a neutral adaptive mechanism of organizations (Selznick, 
1996) which promotes stability by creating “orderly, stable, socially integrating 
patterns out of unstable, loosely organized, or narrowly technical activities” 
(Broom and Selznick, 1955: 238). 
 
The notion of institutionalization in old and new organizational institutionalism 
differs primarily in whether institutionalization is argued to occur within 
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individual organizations or rather within specific domains or fields. In old 
institutionalism, institutions are intra-organizational patterns and activities which 
makes the organization the primary unit of analysis (Greenwood and Hinings, 
1996). Instead, in new institutionalism institutionalized elements are part of more 
widely shared belief systems (Scott, 1987). The implication is that whereas the old 
organizational institutionalist idea of institutionalization can be applied to explain 
differences between organizations, the ‘new’ uses institutionalization to explain 
homogeneity in organizational forms and practices across organizations (Powell 
and DiMaggio, 1991). 
 
Broadly speaking, in the perspective of new organizational institutionalism 
“institutions are taken for granted ways of acting, which derive from shared 
regulative, cognitive and normative frames” (Morgan and Kristensen, 2006: 1470). 
Such beliefs, myths, and symbols are shared across organizational sectors, and 
institutionalized organizational forms and conventions therefore differ by 
organizational field rather than by individual organization (Powell and DiMaggio, 
1991). Organizations conform to such institutionalized beliefs because it is 
rewarding: Conformity increases organizational legitimacy, access to resources 
and, ultimately, organizational survival (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In contrast 
with for example new institutional economics, in new organizational 
institutionalism behaviour is not only restricted through formal institutions, but it 
is also guided and encouraged by cultural-cognitive systems and normative 
pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). It is such isomorphic pressures which 
explain convergence in organizational structures and practices. 
 
In International Business—international management in particular—the notion 
of new institutional distance has been primarily developed and refined in the work 
of Kostova and others (Kostova, 1997; 1999; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Kostova 
and Roth, 2002).  New organizational institutionalists in International Business 
hold that when the institutional environment of countries in which the MNE 
operates differ considerably, MNEs face a considerable challenge in establishing 
and maintaining internal and external legitimacy (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999), and 
in transferring organizational practices to foreign subsidiaries (Kostova, 1999; 
Kostova and Roth, 2002). The larger the institutional distance between the home 
and the host context, the larger the institutional duality experienced by local 
subsidiaries (Kostova and Roth, 2002), and the larger the complexity faced by 
MNEs. Various contributions demonstrate how the institutional environment can 
be decomposed into the respective regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive 
elements which affect organizational behaviour in a particular setting (Kostova, 
1997; Busenitz et al., 2000; Kostova and Roth, 2002). Subsequently, country 
institutional profiles can be compiled which reflect the extent to which the 
institutional environments of countries differ. However, since the institutional 
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elements which guide behaviour in any particular setting are specific to the issue at 
hand, such profiles and institutional distances cannot be generalized (Kostova, 
1997). 
 
The use of new institutional distance in our understanding of International 
Business has become more and more widespread. Xu and Shenkar (2002) for 
example suggest how the regulative, normative, and cognitive distances between 
the home and the host country may affect the location and entry mode strategy of 
MNEs. Others rely on new organizational institutionalist thought to explain 
expatriate adjustment (Ramsey, 2005), subsidiary staffing strategies (Gaur, Delios, 
and Singh, 2007), or the organizational identification of subsidiary managers 
(Vora and Kostova, 2007). However, an important limitation of new institutional 
distance is that the higher the level of aggregation, the more difficult it becomes to 
identify and segregate the relevant regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive 
institutional elements. This is especially the case when one relies on publicly 
available data sources rather than on tailor-made surveys (for a telling example, 
see Xu, Pan, and Beamish, 2004). Therefore, measures of institutional distance 
which build on new organizational institutionalism are most suited to the analysis 
of the legitimacy and transferability of particular practices, rather than the analysis 
of firm-level phenomenon in International Business. 
 
Comparative Historical Institutionalism 
 
Comparative historical institutionalism, in various guises (Whitley, 1999; Maurice 
and Sorge, 2000; Hall and Soskice, 2001), starts from the idea that a country’s key 
institutional elements are reciprocally constituted, in the sense that key 
institutional and societal features developed interdependently over time. This is a 
characteristic it shares with old institutional economics (see Table 2), which in 
similar vein is strongly rooted in the social sciences. Institutions are 
predominantly conceived as social institutions at the societal level, whose relations 
with economic actors and with the organization of economic activity are 
contextually embedded and therefore non-universal. From the perspective of 
comparative historical institutionalism, it is the reciprocal constitution of 
institutions and actors which explains the emergence and persistence of intrinsic 
differences between societies, such as in the organization of work (Maurice et al., 
1986) and production systems (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997), and, more 
generally, in the form of economic organization (Whitley, 1999). 
 
Within the domain of International Business, comparative historical 
institutionalist thought has been employed to understand the effect of 
institutional characteristics of both the country of origin and of the host country 
on the structure and organizational practices of MNEs (Kristensen and Zeitlin, 
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2001). For example, Harzing and Sorge (2003) find that the country of origin 
strongly affects the types of corporate control mechanisms employed. Matten and 
Geppert (2004) suggest that substantive characteristics of both the home and host 
institutional context affect subsidiary work-system design, while Saka (2004) 
relates such differences to the transfer of knowledge. Recent work has emphasized 
how the institutional duality with which MNE subsidiaries are confronted may 
lead to micro-political games and power struggles (Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 
2006), such as over the standardization of practices and policies (Ferner et al., 
2005; Morgan and Kristensen, 2006), or over the internal division of resources 
(Morgan and Kristensen, 2006). 
 
To characterize such inherent country differences, comparative institutionalists 
have traditionally relied on ‘thick’ qualitative descriptions (Maurice, 2000). 
Though insightful, such descriptions often tend to be relatively particularistic (e.g. 
Van Iterson and Olie, 1992), and extensive systematic characterizations of large 
groups of countries are relatively rare. An exception is the empirical work of Hall 
and Soskice (2001) on the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’, which uses the distinction 
between liberal and coordinated market economies to characterize and classify 
Anglo-Saxon and continental European economies. But although Hall and 
Soskice’s parsimonious classification is insightful, reducing modern capitalism to 
two types overlooks the diversity of institutional arrangements that is found 
within the group of coordinated market economies (see e.g. Amable, 2003). 2 
 
To date, perhaps the most elaborate and systematic attempt to classify countries 
by institutional characteristics remains to be found in the work of Richard Whitley 
(1992, 1994, 1999). Whitley’s characterization and classification of distinctive 
business system types, which culminates in the comparative business systems 
framework, is therefore often applied to characterize the institutional environment 
of countries. The comparative business systems framework builds on the 
systematic differences in institutional arrangements and economic activity 
observed in comparative analyses of both European and Asian market economies 
(e.g. Hamilton and Biggart, 1988; Lane, 1992; Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre, 1986; 
Sorge, 1991; Van Iterson and Olie, 1992; Whitley, 1990). 
 
The key notion, as in comparative institutionalism in general, is that the way in 
which economic activities in countries are organized is often internally consistent, 
and that the characteristics of market economies are closely related to the 
dominant type of institutions (Whitley, 1994; 1999). Market economies are argued 
to differ mainly in the dominant type of ownership relations, in how the relations 
                                                
2 Attempts to develop indicators of institutional country differences based on the Varieties of 
Capitalism approach do exist—see e.g. Hall and Gingerich (2004)—but are susceptible to much 
the same critique. 
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between economic actors are coordinated, and in the form employment relations 
take (Whitley, 1998). The particular form a market economy takes is assumed to 
be particularly dependent on four key institutional dimensions: the role assumed 
by the state, the characteristics of the financial system, the skill development 
system, and the norms and values which resonate in work relations (Whitley, 
1998, 1999). The more specific and coherent the institutions, the more distinctive 
and cohesive business systems arise. Similarly, substantively more different 
institutions translate into substantively more different market economies. 
 
Despite the intrinsic interest of IB scholars in the effects of inherent country 
differences on the nature of the MNE (note for example the considerable literature 
on the effects of cultural country differences), no measure of institutional distance 
is currently available which allows for the systematic analysis of the effect of 
inherent societal-level institutional differences. As a result, while the many 
qualitative studies which draw on comparative historical institutionalist thought 
demonstrate the importance of inherent institutional differences in our 
understanding of the MNE, comparative historical institutionalism is poorly 
reflected in quantitative studies in IB. In the remainder of this paper we aim to 
address this major omission from the IB literature by developing a measure of 
institutional distance which draws on Whitley’s business system typology 
(Whitley, 1999). 
 
Table 2:  Classification of Varieties of Institutionalism 
 Nature of institutions 
Focus of analysis Endogenous Exogenous 
Institutions New institutional economics 
Old organizational 
institutionalism 
New organizational 
institutionalism 
Institutional 
interdependencies 
Comparative institutional 
analysis 
Old institutional economics 
Comparative historical 
institutionalism 
Note: Given the distinctive nature of the various varieties of institutionalism, several 
alternative classifications are imaginable, such as by level of analysis, or by disciplinary 
origins. 
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Methodology 
 
Contrary to organizational institutional distance (e.g. Kostova, 1997; Kostova and 
Roth, 2002), or cultural distance for that matter (Kogut and Singh, 1988), the 
indicator of comparative institutional distance developed here aims to be 
indicative of inherent country differences, rather than of differences in latent 
psychological traits. Whether scales or measures which do not intend to measure a 
latent psychological trait or construct are meaningful, mainly depends on whether 
the scores on such indicators correspond with theoretically expected outcomes, 
and on whether the indicators differ sufficiently from indicators for different 
concepts. The measure of comparative institutional distance proposed in this 
paper is therefore developed in the following interrelated steps: the selection of 
suitable indicators and a suitable data source, an assessment of the validity of these 
indicators through two-stage cluster analysis, and the subsequent design of the 
measurement instrument. 
  
Data source 
 
We selected the Global Competitiveness Report (2000) as our primary data 
source3. The Global Competitiveness Report, based largely on survey responses, is 
published annually by the World Economic Forum and contains annually 
collected country data on key institutional and economic characteristics. The 
advantage of using the Global Competitiveness Report stems both from the wide 
range of scales on institutional characteristics included in the survey, and from the 
use of standardized questions which facilitates systematic comparison. For these 
reasons, the Global Competitiveness Report is a frequent source of reference for 
institutional data (e.g. Rao, Pearce, and Xin, 2005; Xu, Pan, and Beamish, 2004; 
Gaur and Lu, 2007). While the questions in the questionnaire of the Global 
Competitiveness Report are not specifically designed to reflect the institutional 
features of business systems, the indicators are of use to the present study if the 
variety in country scores corresponds closely with the theoretically expected 
variety in inherent institutional differences between countries. In such instances, 
these indicators can be appropriately used as proxies for the corresponding 
institutional characteristics. As discussed later on, the extent to which the two-step 
cluster analysis reproduces Whitley’s business system typology is a good indication 
of the validity of the selected indicators, and, more generally, of the Global 
Competitiveness Report as a suitable data source. 
 
                                                
3
 We selected the 2000 edition of the Global Competitiveness Report because in later editions the 
wording of many questions was altered, which obscured substantive differences in, for example, 
the role of the state, skill development, or trust and authority relations. 
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Sample 
 
For the verification of our measure of comparative institutional distance, we 
selected a sample consisting of all OECD countries from the Global Competitive-
ness Report. This is done as Whitley’s business system typology largely applies to 
market economies in which stable social institutions have materialized, which 
mainly applies to the industrialised countries included in the OECD. An 
additional argument is that the typology of business systems has been developed 
on the basis of a relatively small set of mostly well-developed countries. This 
modest set of countries includes (near-)ideal-types which have been frequently 
characterized in the literature, such as Germany, the UK, and South Korea. In 
order to assess the validity of our measure, it is therefore considered important to 
include these countries in our sample. The sample of OECD countries consists of 
all thirty member states. 
 
Selection of variables 
 
We matched the key institutional features identified by Whitley (1999) with 
indicators from the Global Competitiveness Report 2000 which best captured 
these institutional characteristics (Table 3). Such a ‘deductive approach’ to the 
selection of clustering variables (Ketchen and Shook, 1996) is recommended when 
the clustering variables are strongly tied to extant theory, and tends to produce 
better results (Punj and Stewart, 1983). Table 4 presents a correlation matrix of 
the selected indicators. All scores on the selected indicators ranged between one 
and seven, and we inverted the scores on union power for interpretive purposes.A 
list of the corresponding questions used in the questionnaire of the Global 
Competitiveness Report can be found in Appendix A. We identified appropriate 
indicators for all institutional features, except for the dominant organizing 
principle of unions, the extent to which bargaining is centralized, and the more 
specific extent to which communal norms govern authority relations. The 
rationale for the selection of indicators is explained below by institutional area. 
 
The state.  Three characteristics of the role of the state are particularly important 
in promoting and sustaining different forms of economic organization: the 
strength of the state, the tolerance of the state for intermediate associations 
between the state and firms, and the extent to which the state is involved in the 
regulation of markets (Whitley, 1999). 
 
The first feature refers both to the strength of the state in relation to special 
interest groups such as social elites, and to the role of the state in the development 
of economic activity. While these are essentially two separate features, taken 
together this institutional characteristic reflects the extent to which firms are 
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dependent on support from the state through state policies. Two indicators were 
selected to reflect inherent differences in the dominance of the state. The first 
indicator reflects the extent to which government policies are independent from elites 
and special interest groups. The second indicator is the extent to which government 
subsidies promote fair competition. The assumption here is that states which assume 
a more developmental role are more selective in granting subsidies. States with an 
arm’s length approach, on the other hand, are assumed to have a greater interest 
in pursuing policies which promote fair competition. As expected, scores on the 
two selected indicators are highly correlated (r = 0.75). 
 
To reflect the degree of state antagonism to intermediary associations, an indicator 
was selected from the Global Competitiveness Report which signifies the 
Table 3: Institutional indicators  
Key institutional features Indicatorsa 
The state  
Dominance of the state and its willingness 
to share risk 
Independence of government policies from 
elites and special interest groups (3.05) 
The extent to which government subsidies 
promote competition (3.03) 
State antagonism to collective 
intermediaries 
The pervasiveness of industrial clusters 
and specialized institutions (10.16) 
Extent of formal regulation of markets The burden of regulation (3.01) 
 
Financial systems 
 
Capital market or credit based Access to external finance (8.04) 
The use of the stock market (8.11) 
 
Skill development and control system 
 
Strength of public training system The difference in quality of schools 
available to rich and poor children (6.02) 
Strength of independent trade unions The extent of union power and influence 
(6.10) 
Trust and authority relations  
Trust in formal institutions Public trust of politicians (4.16) 
Predominance of paternalist authority 
relations 
The willingness to delegate authority to 
subordinates (11.3) 
The extent to which management-worker 
relations are cooperative (6.09) 
a Corresponding items in the Global Competitiveness Report 2000 are in parenthesis 
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pervasiveness of industrial clusters and specialized institutions. The extent of formal 
regulation of markets is reflected by the burden of regulation which firms experience. 
The assumption is that the type of regulatory role assumed by the state is reflected 
in the number of regulations with which businesses have to comply. As would be 
expected, the burden of regulation correlates strongly with both the extent to 
which government policies are independent from special interest groups (r = 0.73) 
and with the extent to which subsidies promote fair competition (r = 0.66). 
 
Financial systems.  Financial systems can differ considerably in how capital is 
raised. Generally, the distinction is made between financial systems which rely on 
external capital markets, and financial systems which are credit-based and where 
borrower and lender are more interlocked. As Monnet and Quintin (2007) 
illustrate, such differences persist even if fundamental characteristics of domestic 
financial systems converge. To reflect these differences, two indicators are selected. 
The first indicator reflects the general availability of external finance, while the 
second indicator reflects the general use of the stock market. Considered together, 
high scores on both reflect financial systems which rely heavily on the capital 
market. Low scores reflect financial systems where capital markets are tight or 
relatively weakly developed, and where as a result businesses are reliant on other 
capital allocation processes, resulting in more credit-based financial systems. The 
availability of external funding and the use of the stock market however are two 
distinct characteristics of domestic financial systems (Bencivenga, Smith, and 
Starr, 1996; Greenwood and Smith, 1997), and the correlation between these 
indicators subsequently is low (r = 0.22). 
 
Skill development and control system.  The dimension on skill development and 
control system represents both the extent to which practical learning and formal 
public education are integrated, and the extent to which the development of 
practical skills is jointly organized and/or certified by the state, unions, and firms. 
From the perspective of the state, a strong collaborative public training system 
requires an education system where the aim is not to filter out the failures from 
the academic high-fliers, but rather to ensure the overall quality of the output of 
the education system; whether this leads to practical skill training or to the pursuit 
of higher education. As Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre (1986) illustrate, in 
Germany the strength of both university education and professional education—a 
collaborative effort of both the state, unions, and employers—has the effect that 
worker placement is less strongly associated with the level of general education 
than in France, and more strongly with occupational skills. To the contrary, the 
selective and generalist nature of the French education system parallels a work 
system in which both occupation and status are more strongly associated with the 
level of general education which one has attained.  
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It is presumed here that the overall strength of the public education system is 
reflected in the extent to which the quality of schools available to children from rich 
and poor families differs, with stronger educational systems resulting in less 
difference in the quality of education available to the rich and the poor. This seems 
reasonable. Maurice et al. (1986) find that in France, the probability of the child of 
a senior manager attaining a baccalaureate is nearly six times higher than that of 
the child of an agricultural or industrial worker. This is not surprising. In 
countries where job placement, wage, and social standing correlate more strongly 
with the level of general education, parents have a greater incentive to pursue 
access for their children to schools of higher standing and quality. In countries 
where professional success is based on progress through the educational system 
rather than on occupational skill, children of rich families are therefore even more 
likely to attend schools of higher quality, and are even more predisposed to attain 
a degree of higher education, than in countries with a strong collaborative 
education system. We therefore select the indicator on educational equality from 
the Global Competitiveness Report to reflect the overall strength of the public 
training system. 
 
To reflect the strength of independent trade unions, we select the Global 
Competitiveness Report indicator on the extent of union power and influence. As 
Whitley (1999) argues, strong unions affect the strategic orientation of domestic 
firms, the adoption of technologies, and even the structure of markets. Strong 
unions, however, are not necessarily reflected in an egalitarian or more 
professionally oriented education system. For example, whereas unions in 
Australia have traditionally exerted reasonable influence, especially in some 
industries (Hampson and Morgan, 1999), the education system continues to be 
largely generalist in nature (Bagnall, 2000)4. And whereas the Swiss education 
system is characterized by a dual system of higher education in which vocational 
colleges feature prominently (Hanhart and Bossio, 1998), the certification of skills 
is largely in the hands of the state and sees little involvement of the traditionally 
weak labour unions (Höpflinger, 1981). The modest correlation between equality 
of schooling and union power (r=0.34) reflects this. 
 
Trust and authority relations.  Prevailing norms and values regarding trust and 
authority affect the structuring of employer-employee relationships as well as the 
structuring of exchange relations between firms (Whitley, 1999). 
 
While trust comes in different forms (Couch, Adams, and Jones, 1996), key for 
understanding differences in both socio-economic order and in authority relation-
                                                
4
 This despite efforts since the late 1990s to propagate vocational training and to reduce the 
difference in status associated with general and vocational education paths (Bagnall, 2000). 
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ships is the type of generalized trust individuals put in both unknown others and 
in the social institutions which promote and guarantee such trust. Generalized 
trust is a rather homogeneous construct, affecting for example both social capital 
(Paxton, 1999) and superior-subordinate relations (Payne and Clark, 2003). We 
therefore assume that the extent to which formal institutions are able to generate 
and guarantee trust is—at least in part—associated with the trust people put in the 
politicians which shape and govern these institutions. Accordingly, we include the 
indicator on public trust in politicians as a proxy for the general trust in formal 
institutions. 
 
Whitley (1999) characterizes differences in employer-employee relations 
according to the distinction between paternalistic and formal cultures. Differences 
between the two essentially pertain to i) the scope of superior discretion, which is 
limited to the work context in formal cultures but which extends well into the 
personal sphere in paternalistic cultures, and ii) to whether subordinates can be 
entrusted with the responsibilities of decision-making. The implications of these 
differences extend to other characteristics of work relations, such as to the extent 
to which managerial decisions require further justification (Whitley, 1999) and the 
extent of post-employment care and benefits (Pellegrini and Scandura, 2008). 
Here, the nature of employer-employee relations, or rather the predominance of 
paternalism, is reflected in two related indicators (r = 0.61): the willingness to 
delegate authority to subordinates, and the extent to which management-worker 
relations are cooperative. The assumption is that in more paternalist cultures the 
willingness to delegate is lower, and that management-worker relations are less 
cooperative. Instead, in more formal political cultures, trust in subordinates is 
presumed to be higher, resulting in a higher willingness to delegate tasks and more 
cooperative superior-subordinate relations. 
 
This association of paternalism with the readiness to delegate finds support in the 
recent international management literature on paternalistic leadership. What 
paternalistic leadership entails, however, has become subject of debate; in 
particular the question whether paternalistic acts are performed with benevolent 
intent (Pellegrini and Scandura, 2008). Many—mostly western—authors tend to 
associate paternalism with patronizing and authoritarian leadership styles. Whitley 
(1999) for example characterizes paternalistic leadership styles by the tendency to 
“treat subordinates as children who cannot be expected to know their own best 
interests and act accordingly” (1999: 52). Others tend to describe paternalism as 
the personal concern and involvement with the well-being of subordinates which 
goes beyond the interests of the superior (Pellegrini and Scandura, 2006; Gelfand, 
Erez, & Aycan, 2007, Pasa, Kabasakal, and Bodur, 2001). But while there is debate 
over what leadership constructs are associated with paternalism, there appears to 
be agreement on the view that “[e]mployees in high-power distance cultures may 
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expect the leader to take charge and give orders, rather than delegate decision-
making authority to the subordinate” (Pellegrini and Scandura, 2006: 274). Both 
paternalism and the associated high power distance have been used to explain why 
delegation is not a universally accepted element of effective management 
(Pellegrini and Scandura, 2006; 2008), and our association of paternalism with the 
willingness to delegate therefore appears supported. Furthermore, the willingness 
to delegate authority to subordinates correlates strongly with the indicator on 
trust in politicians (r = 0.80). This correctly reflects the notion that in addition to 
situational factors, the structure of superior-subordinate work relations is strongly 
affected by the level of generalized trust (Payne and Clark, 2003). 
 
Cluster analysis 
 
We applied cluster analysis to our sample of OECD countries in order to assess the 
validity of the selected institutional indicators. Cluster analysis is a statistical 
method used for the classification of empirical data on the basis of pre-defined 
cluster variables. Clusters are defined such that the within-group variance is 
minimized and between-group variance is maximized. Cluster analysis relies 
extensively on a researcher’s judgement, and hence the validity of obtained 
solutions are susceptible to critique (Ketchen and Shook, 1996). To obtain the best 
results we therefore largely follow the recommendations of Punj and Stewart 
(1983) and Ketchen and Shook (1996) by performing a two-stage clustering 
procedure, which increases the validity of the cluster solutions (Punj and Stewart, 
1983). In the first stage, a hierarchical clustering method is used to identify the 
most suitable number of clusters. In the second stage, an iterative clustering 
method is used to derive the optimal clustering solution. The extent to which the 
results of the cluster analysis reproduce Whitley’s business system typology is a 
good indication of the validity of the selected indicators. 
 
 
Results 
 
The first step in our cluster analysis was to empirically determine the appropriate 
number of clusters. Using SPSS, we therefore first performed a hierarchical cluster 
analysis using Ward’s minimum variance method, based on squared Euclidean 
distance. Ward’s method is recommended when the cluster sizes are expected to 
be approximately equal, and when there are no outliers (Ketchen and Shook, 
1996). We identified five clusters on the basis of the resulting dendrogram, and on 
the basis of our expectation that the fragmented business system type—largely 
reserved for countries with unreliable formal institutions (Whitley, 1999)—would 
not be present in our sample of OECD countries. 
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Next, we performed a K-Means cluster analysis to optimize the results. The 
resulting cluster centroids and country groupings are displayed in Tables 5 and 6. 
To see whether the obtained clusters were meaningful, we made our cluster scores 
comparable with Whitley’s (1999) characterization of the institutional features 
associated with the various business system types. The highest and lowest cluster 
centroids of each variable were labelled ‘high’ and ‘low’. Intermediate scores were 
labelled ‘limited’, ‘some’, and ‘considerable’, depending on their relative closeness 
to the highest and lowest scores. We averaged the labels of the institutional 
features for which we used two indicators. We then matched the identified clusters 
with business system types from Whitley’s (1999) comparative business systems 
framework; the results of which are presented in Table 7. 
 
 
Table 5:  Final cluster centres 
Dimension Clusters 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Independence of state 
policies 
4.5 3.5 3.6 3.8 2.9 
Subsidies promote 
competition 
4.8 3.7 3.8 4.5 3.1 
Pervasiveness of clusters 4.7 4.9 4.1 4.7 4.3 
Market regulation 4.4 3.4 3.5 4.0 3.2 
Access to stock market 5.9 5.2 5.1 5.2 4.5 
Access to external finance 4.0 3.9 4.1 4.3 3.9 
Difference in quality of 
schools 
6.4 5.8 3.5 4.0 5.2 
Union power 4.3 5.3 4.2 3.5 4.3 
Trust of politicians 5.8 4.3 3.1 4.0 2.6 
Management/worker relations 5.9 5.3 4.4 5.1 4.8 
Delegation of authority 5.6 5.4 3.7 5.2 3.7 
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Table 6:  Cluster membership 
Cluster membershipa 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Netherlands 
Iceland 
Denmark 
Luxembourg 
Switzerland 
Finland 
 
Sweden 
Austria 
Canada 
Belgium 
Germany 
Norway  
 
 
Portugal 
Turkey  
Hungary 
Greece 
Spain 
Korea 
France 
Mexico  
 
Cluster 4 Cluster 5  
United Kingdom 
Australia 
New Zealand 
United States 
Ireland 
Slovakia 
Czech Republic 
Italy 
Poland  
Japan 
 
   
a Ranked according to distance to cluster centre 
 
 
Discussion 
 
As Table 7 illustrates, clusters 2, 3, and 4 correspond closely with the collaborative, 
state organized, and compartmentalized business system types respectively. The 
most notable differences are that cluster 3 scores somewhat lower on both the 
strength of state coordination and the extent of market regulation, and higher on 
union strength than the state-organized ideal type. Cluster 4 displays slightly 
higher levels of state involvement than the compartmentalized business system 
type, and somewhat lower levels of trust in formal institutions. Cluster 5 
corresponds reasonably well both with the highly coordinated and with the 
coordinated industrial district business system types. The main differences here 
are that cluster 5 scores markedly lower on the incorporation of intermediaries 
than either the highly coordinated or the coordinated industrial district ideal type. 
Cluster 1, scoring low on direct state involvement and high on strength of the 
public training system and on trust in formal institutions, could not be clearly 
associated with any of the business system types of Whitley’s typology.  
 
When we take cluster membership into consideration (Table 6), we see that the 
composition of the clusters generally corresponds with characterizations in the 
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literature. The inclusion of both Germany and Sweden in cluster 2, which 
corresponds most closely with the collaborative business system type, is according 
to expectations (Whitley, 2000; Almond, Edwards, and Clark, 2003). Cluster 3 
includes both France and South Korea, which in the literature are frequent 
examples of state organized economies (Whitley, 2000). Cluster 4, which 
corresponds most closely with the compartmentalized business system, only 
includes Anglo-Saxon countries, which is also in line with characterizations in the 
literature (Whitley, 2000). A notable exception to the group of Anglo-Saxon 
countries is Canada, which is included in the cluster corresponding most closely 
with the collaborative business system type (cluster 2). We see that Cluster 5 
contains both Japan and Italy, which are generally associated with the highly 
coordinated (Whitley, 1994; Saka, 2004) and coordinated industrial district 
(Trigilia, 1990; Whitley, 1998) business systems respectively. This may suggest that 
these two business system types cannot be clearly distinguished based on the 
selected indicators. Alternatively, this may be due to the properties of the applied 
clustering method. For example, Ward’s clustering method, as used in the 
hierarchical cluster analysis, tends to produce comparatively similar-sized clusters. 
 
The small open economies of Northern Europe emerge as a separate group in 
cluster 1. Both the results of the cluster analyses and the particular scores of cluster 
1 suggest that this group of countries represents a distinctive business system type, 
characterized by low direct state involvement combined with high trust levels, the 
considerable incorporation of intermediaries, and a strong public training system. 
The institutional features of this cluster suggest strongly developed informal 
institutions, which may to some extent reflect pre-industrial values and relations, 
as suggested earlier for both the Netherlands (Van Iterson and Olie, 1992) and 
Denmark (Kristensen, 1996). The clustering of these countries in a separate group 
is noteworthy as it provides a counter-argument to suggestions that some of the 
smaller economies in northern Europe may be examples of hybrid business 
systems (e.g. Whitley, 2000), combining for example characteristics of the 
compartmentalized and collaborative ideal types. While this cluster indeed seems 
to share characteristics of both, the results of the cluster analysis suggest that the 
variation in institutional characteristics is systematic. This suggests that the 
institutional structuring of the countries in cluster 1 is both distinctive and 
coherent, rather than a combination of institutional features of countries with 
ostensibly more distinctive national business systems. 
 
Overall, we see that the clusters formed on the basis of the selected institutional 
indicators correspond considerably well with Whitley’s business system typology. 
This lends support to our institutional indicators as well as to the distinctiveness 
of the business system types. What must be kept in mind is that Whitley 
characterizes ideal types, and that the institutional contexts of countries may 
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naturally show some variation in their correspondence with such a theoretically 
defined typology. Given the relatively broad sample used here, covering four 
continents, we conclude that the outcome of the two-step cluster analysis lends 
sufficient support to our institutional indicators. 
 
 
A Measure of Comparative Institutional Distance 
 
The final step in the development of our measure of comparative institutional 
distance is the design of the actual measure. The key decision here is how the 
various institutional indicators should relate to each other, and how institutional 
distances between countries should be calculated based on the indicators at hand. 
We largely follow Kogut and Singh (1988) in the design of their widely applied 
measure of cultural distance based on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 
1980), except for that we do not to correct for differences in variance. As Kogut 
and Singh (1988) concur, correcting for variance imposes certain weights on the 
indicators included in a composite index. When the original scores are scaled 
similarly, as is the case in the Global Competitiveness Report, correcting for 
variance would inflate relatively small institutional differences between countries, 
while it would marginalize more considerable institutional differences. In such 
instances, the resulting institutional distances would be unnecessarily distorted. 
Ultimately, our measure of comparative institutional distance therefore takes the 
form of:  
! 
IDjk = (Iij " Iik )
2
/11
i=1
11
#  
 
where 
! 
IDjk  is the institutional distance between countries j and k, and 
! 
(Iij " Iik )  is 
the difference in scores of countries j and k on institutional feature i. The resulting 
institutional distances between the countries in our sample of OECD member 
states are included in Appendix B5. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
On the outset, the objective of this paper was to develop and validate a measure of 
institutional distance which captures the qualitative institutional differences in 
economic organization between countries. Building on the comparative work of 
                                                
5
 Both the institutional distance indicator developed here and the cultural distance index by Kogut 
and Singh (1989) are based on (averaged) squared Euclidean distances. This method imposes 
progressively greater weight on objects (e.g. countries) that are more different. Appendix C 
contains the institutional distances which result when (standard) Euclidean distances are 
calculated. 
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Richard Whitley (1999), we identified and validated appropriate institutional 
indicators which can be used in a composite index of comparative institutional 
distance. The results of the two-step cluster analysis largely replicated Whitley’s 
typology of business systems, which adds support to the selection of the 
institutional indicators. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is in that it addresses the under-
representation of comparative historical institutional thought in currently 
available measures of institutional distance. It has been illustrated that for two out 
of three dominant strands of institutionalism in IB, namely new institutional 
economics and new organizational institutionalism, measures of institutional 
distance are available. Although the third strand of institutionalism, which 
Morgan and Kristensen (2006) labelled comparative historical institutionalism, 
has contributed significantly to our understanding of the effects of inherent 
institutional differences between societies on the nature of MNEs, it is poorly 
reflected in quantitative studies in IB due to the lack of an appropriate measure of 
comparative institutional distance. The measure proposed in this paper may help 
address the lack of comparative historical thought in quantitative analyses. 
 
The second contribution of this paper is in that, to the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first study to provide quantitative support for the distinctiveness of several 
of the business system types that make up the business systems framework 
(Whitley, 1992; 1999). As indicated earlier, the business systems framework 
emerged from detailed but relatively particularistic socio-economic accounts and 
comparisons of both Asian and European market economies (e.g. Hamilton and 
Biggart, 1988; Van Iterson and Olie, 1992; Redding, 1990) rather than from the 
systematic comparison of a wide set of countries from the outset. This makes the 
business systems framework susceptible to criticism that the ideal types reflect 
idiosyncrasies of the countries considered—such as Japan and Korea—rather than 
of aggregated business system types. The results of the cluster analysis clearly 
suggest that Whitley’s characterization holds even when a wider set of developed 
economies is considered. 
 
A third contribution of this paper is in the identification of an unnamed yet 
distinctive business system type which appears characteristic of some of the small 
open economies of Northern Europe. In particular, this group of countries 
displays relatively low direct state involvement, combined with high trust levels, 
the considerable incorporation of intermediaries, and a strong public training 
system. While the institutional characteristics of these economies show similarities 
with several other business system types, such as with the collaborative and 
compartmentalized ideal types, the results of the cluster analyses suggest that the 
variation in institutional features is systematic. This suggests that the business 
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systems framework may have to be complemented with a more consociational 
business system type, where the diverse interests of economic actors are reconciled 
through inclusion and coordinated on the basis of strong informal institutions. 
 
However, the indicators incorporated into our measure of institutional distance 
are proxies rather than direct measures of the key institutional elements identified 
by Whitley. As such, one may argue that public trust in politicians does not fully 
reflect the trust of the public in formal institutions, or that the difference in the 
quality of schools available to rich and poor children does not correspond fully 
with the over-all strength of the public training system. Yet, for the calculation of a 
composite measure of institutional distance, such proxies do suffice as long as the 
variation on the indicators used corresponds sufficiently with the variation in 
institutional characteristics (see Cronbach, 1971). The results of the two-step 
cluster analysis demonstrate that on the basis of the indicators used in our 
measure of institutional distance, Whitley’s business system typology can be 
reproduced, which builds a strong case for the appropriateness of these indicators. 
 
Another potential limitation is that we were unable to identify appropriate 
indicators for three institutional sub-features: the dominant organizing principle 
of unions, the extent to which bargaining is centralized, and the extent to which 
communal norms govern authority relations. Possibly as a result of this, we were 
unable to distinguish between the highly coordinated and the coordinated 
industrial cluster business system types, although alternative explanations should 
also be considered. For example, the share of countries in our sample which have 
been characterized as dominated by coordinated industrial clusters is relatively 
small. A close inspection of the calculated distances between the countries in our 
sample (see Appendix B) learns that the omission of these institutional features 
does not result in counter-intuitive institutional distances. 
 
Paradoxically, perhaps the most important limitation of our institutional indicator 
is that essentially, the idea of capturing intrinsic institutional country differences 
in a single measure of institutional distance runs counter to the very idea of 
comparative institutionalism with its emphasis on thick description (see e.g. 
Redding, 2005). But does that imply that we should leave out and ignore inherent 
institutional country differences from quantitative analyses altogether? The central 
gist of this paper has been that if we are to include country variables on inherent 
differences into our analyses, then at least let us include indicators which have 
some theoretical substance, and which have been proven to correspond at least 
reasonably well with the theoretically and empirically expected variation in 
institutional characteristics. 
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We recommend the use of our indicator of comparative institutional distance in 
the quantitative analysis of IB phenomena where inherent country-level 
differences may potentially matter. Examples are studies on subjects where the 
effects of national cultural differences have traditionally been considered, such as 
in studies on internationalization sequence, subsidiary performance, or 
international joint venture dissolution. We imagine that comparative institutional 
distance can also be employed as an alternative or complement to economic 
institutional distance indicators in the analysis of e.g. location decisions (cf. 
Treviño and Mixon, 2004) or entry and establishment mode selection (cf. Meyer, 
2001; Dikova and Van Witteloostuijn, 2007). Finally, we recommend the use of 
comparative institutional distance as an alternative to organizational institutional 
distance (Kostova, 1997; Kostova and Roth, 2002) in studies where the level of 
analysis does not easily allow for the decomposition of the institutional 
environment into distinctive regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive 
components. Attempts to include narrowly compiled cognitive institutional 
profiles in the analysis of IB phenomena which transcend single cognitive domains 
occur far too often. 
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